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Summary. In our model, n traders interact with each other and with a central
bank; they are taxed on the money they make, some of which is dissipated away
by corruption. A generic feature of our model is that the richest trader always
wins by ’consuming’ all the others: another is the existence of a threshold wealth,
below which all traders go bankrupt. The two-trader case is examined in detail,
in the socialist and capitalist limits, which generalise easily to n > 2. In its mean-
field incarnation, our model exhibits a two-time-scale glassy dynamics, as well as
an astonishing universality. When preference is given to local interactions in finite
neighbourhoods, a novel feature emerges: instead of at most one overall winner in
the system, finite numbers of winners emerge, each one the overlord of a particular
region. The patterns formed by such winners (metastable states) are very much a
consequence of initial conditions, so that the fate of the marketplace is ruled by its
past history; hysteresis is thus also manifested.
1 Introduction
The tools of statistical mechanics [1] are increasingly being used to analyse
problems of economic relevance [2]. Our model below, although originally for-
mulated to model the evolution of primordial black holes [3, 4], is an interesting
illustration of the rich-get-richer principle in economics. It is inherently dise-
quilibrating; individual traders interact in such a way that the richest trader
always wins.
2 The model
In this model, n traders are linked to each other, as well as to a federal reserve
bank; an individual’s money accrues interest at the rate of α > 1/2 [3] but is
also taxed such that it is depleted at the rate of 1/t, where t is the time. The
interaction strength gij between traders i and j is a measure of how much
of their wealth is invested in trading; income from trading is also taxed at
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the rate of t1/2. There is a threshold term such that the less a trader has, the
more he loses; additionally the model is non-conservative such that some of
the wealth disappears forever from the local economy. These last terms can
have different interpretations in a macro- or a micro-economic context. In the
former case (where the traders could all be citizens of a country linked by
a federal bank), the threshold term could represent the plight of the (van-
ishing) middle classes, while the non-conservative nature of the model could
represent the contribution of corruption to the economy - some of the taxed
money disappears forever from the region, to go either to the black econ-
omy or to foreign shores. In a more micro-economic context (where traders
linked by a bank are a subset of the major economy), the interpretation is
the reverse: the non-conservative nature of the model would imply money lost
irretrievably by taxation (to go to social benefits from which the traders do
not themselves benefit), while the threshold term could represent the effect
of corruption (poorer traders lose more by graft than richer ones). Including
all these features, we postulate that the wealth mi(t) for i = 1, . . . , n of each
trader evolves as follows [4]:
dmi
dt
=

α
t
−
1
t1/2
∑
j
gij
dmj
dt

mi − 1
mi
. (1)
In the following,we use units of reduced time s = ln tt0 (to renormalise
away the effect of initial time t0), reduced wealth xi =
mi
t1/2
and reduced
square wealth yi = x
2
i =
m2i
t . In these units, we recall the result for an isolated
trader [3]. A trader whose initial wealth y0 is greater than y⋆, (with y⋆(t0) =(
2t0
2α−1
)
), is a survivor who keeps getting richer forever: a trader with below
this threshold wealth goes bankrupt and disappears from the marketplace in
a finite time. The influence of this initial threshold y⋆ will be seen to persist
throughout this model: in every case we examine, surviving winners will all
be wealthier than this.
3 A tale of two traders: socialist vs capitalist?
We examine the two-trader case in the socialist and capitalist limits. In the
socialist limit, the initial equality of wealth is maintained forever by symmetry:
their common wealth x(s) obeys:
x′ =
(2α− 1)x2 − 2− gx3
2x(1 + gx)
. (2)
This equation is analytically tractable: it has fixed points given by (2α−1)x2−
2−gx3 = 0. A critical value of the interaction strength g, gc =
(
2(2α−1)3
27
)1/2
,
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separates two qualitatively different behaviours. For g > gc, there is no
fixed point; overly heavy trading (insufficient saving) causes both traders
to go quickly bankrupt, independent of their initial capital. In the oppo-
site case of sensible trading, g < gc, there are two positive fixed points,
y
1/2
⋆ < x(1) (unstable) < (3y⋆)
1/2 < x(2) (stable). If both traders are initial
equally poor with wealth x0 < x(1), this is dynamically attracted by x = 0
– the traders go rapidly bankrupt! For initially rich traders with x0 > x(1),
their wealth is dynamically attracted by x(2) – they grow richer forever as
m(t) ≈ x(2)t
1/2, a growth rate which is less than that for an isolated trader!
This case, where equality and overall prosperity prevail even though there are
no individual winners, could correspond to a (modern) Marxist vision.
In the capitalist case, with traders who are initially unequally wealthy,
any small differences always diverge exponentially early on: the details of this
transient behaviour can be found in [5]. However, the asymptotic behaviour is
such that richer trader wins, while the poorer one goes bankrupt: the survival
of the richest is the single generic scenario for two unequally wealthy traders.
At this point, we are back to the case of an isolated trader referred to in
Section 3: he may, depending on whether his wealth at this point is less or
greater than y⋆, also go bankrupt or continue to get richer forever.
All of the above generalises easily to any finite number n ≥ 2 of interacting
traders.
4 Infinitely many traders in a soup - the mean field limit
We now examine the limit n → ∞: we first explore the mean field behaviour
where every trader is connected to every other by the same dilute interaction
g = gn . For fixed g, the limit n→∞ leads to the mean field equations [5]:
y′(s) = γ(s)y(s)− 2 (3)
When additionally, g is small (weak trading), a glassy dynamics [1] with two-
step relaxation is observed. In Stage I, individual traders behave as if they
were isolated, so that the survivors are richer than threshold (y⋆), exactly as
in the one-trader case of Section 2. In Stage II, all traders interact collectively,
and slowly [5]. All but the richest trader eventually go bankrupt during this
stage.
The model also manifests a striking universality. For example, with an ex-
ponential distribution of initial wealth, the survival probability decays asymp-
totically as S(t) ≈ 2α−1g
(
C ln tt0
)
−1/2
; additionally, the mean wealth of the
surviving traders grows as 〈〈m〉〉t ≈
(
C t ln tt0
)1/2
. In both cases, C = π ir-
respective of α, g and the parameters of the exponential distribution. The
universality we observe goes further than this, in fact: it can be shown [5]
that C only depends on whether the initial distribution of wealth is bounded
or not and on (the shape of) the tail of the wealth distribution.
4 Anita Mehta, A S Majumdar and J M Luck
5 Infinitely many traders with local interactions - the
emergence of overlords
Still in the n→∞ limit, we now introduce local interactions: traders interact
preferentially with their z = 2D nearest neighbours on a D-dimensional lat-
tice: once again we look at the limit of weak trading (g ≪ 1). The dynamics
once again consists of two successive well-separated stages with fast individual
Stage I dynamics, whose survivors are richer than threshold, exactly as before
(Section 4). The effects of going beyond mean field are only palpable in Stage
II: the effect of local interactions lead to a slow dynamics which is now very
different from the mean-field scenario above. The survival probability S(s)
in fact decays from its plateau value S(1) (number of Stage I survivors) to a
non-trivial limiting value S(∞); unlike the mean field result, a finite fraction
of traders now survive forever!
Figure 1 illustrates this two-step relaxation in the decay of the survival
probability S(s). While the (non-interacting) decay to the plateau at S(1) =
0.8 is (rightly) independent of g, the Stage II relaxation shows ageing; the
weaker the interaction, the longer the system takes to reach the (non-trivial)
limit survival probability S(∞) ≈ 0.4134.
Fig. 1. Plot of the survival probability S(s) on the chain with S(1) = 0.8 (after
reference [5]. Left to right: Full line: g = 10−3. Dashed line: g = 10−4. Long-dashed
line: g = 10−5. Dash-dotted line: g = 10−6.
At the end of Stage II, the system is left in a non-trivial attractor, which
consists of a pattern where each surviving trader is isolated, an overlord who
keeps getting richer forever. We call these attractors metastable states, since
they form valleys in the existing random energy landscape; the particular
metastable state chosen by the system (corresponding to a particular choice of
pattern) is the one which can most easily be reached in this landscape[1]. The
number N of these states generically grows exponentially with the system size
(number of sites) N as N ∼ exp(NΣ) with Σ the configurational entropy or
complexity. The limit survival probability S(∞) (Figure 1) is just the density
How the rich get richer 5
of a typical attractor, i.e., the fraction of the initial clusters which survive
forever.
We now examine in some more detail the fate of a set of k ≥ 1 surviving
traders: this depends on k as follows.
⋆ k = 1: If there is only one trader, he survives forever, trading with the
reserve and getting richer.
⋆ k = 2: If a pair of neighbouring traders (represented as ••) survive Stage I,
the poorer dies out, while the richer is an overlord, leading to •◦ or ◦•.
⋆ k ≥ 3: If three or more traders survive Stage I, they may have more than
one fate. Consider for instance (•••): if the middle trader goes bankrupt
first (•◦•), the two end ones are isolated, and both will become overlords.
If on the other hand the trader at the ’end’ first goes bankrupt (e.g. ••◦),
only the richer among them will become an overlord (e.g. •◦◦). The pattern
of these immortal overlords, and even their number, therefore cannot be
predicted a priori.
Finally, we present some of the observed patterns. If S(∞) = 1/2 on, say,
a square lattice, (i.e. the highest density of surviving traders is reached),
there are only two possible ‘ground-state’ configurations of the system; the
two possible patterns of immortal overlords are each perfect checkerboards of
one of two possible parities. This allows for an interesting possibility: we can
define a checkerboard index for each site, which classifies it according to its
parity [5].
Fig. 2. Two complementary representations of a typical pattern of surviving clusters
on a 402 sample of the square lattice, with S(1) = 0.9, so that S(∞) ≈ 0.371 (after
reference [5]. Left: Map of the survival index. Black squares represent overlords
for which σn = 1, while white squares represent bankrupt sites for which σn = 0.
Right: Map of the checkerboard index. Black squares represent positive, while white
squares represent negative, parity
Figure 2 shows a map of the survival index and of the checkerboard index
for the same attractor for a particular sample of the square lattice. The local
checkerboard structure, with random frozen-in defects between patterns of
different parities is of course entirely inherited from the initial conditions.
The overlords in the left-hand part of the figure are surrounded by rivulets of
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poverty ; in the right-hand figure, the deviation from a perfect checkerboard
structure (all black or all white) is made clearer. Neighbouring sites are fully
anticorrelated, because each overlord is surrounded by paupers: however, at
least close to the limit S(∞) = 1/2, overlords are very likely to have next-
nearest neighbours who are likewise overlords. The detailed examination of
survival and mass correlation functions made in a longer paper [5] confirms
these expectations.
To conclude, we have presented a model where traders interact through a
reserve; we are able to model the effects of corruption and taxation via the
non-conservative, threshold nature of our model. These could have different
implications for micro- and macroeconomic situations. Our main results are
that, in the presence of global interactions, typically only the wealthiest trader
survives (provided he was born sufficiently rich); however, if traders interact
locally, finite numbers of local overlords emerge by creating zones of poverty
around them.
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